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Abstract
In the coming years, operations in low altitude airspace will vastly increase as the
capabilities and applications of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) continue to
multiply. Therefore, finding solutions to managing sUAS in highly congested airspace
will facilitate sUAS operations. In this study, a fuzzy logic-based approach was used to
help mitigate the risk of collisions between aircraft using separation assurance and
collision avoidance techniques. The system was evaluated for its effectiveness at miti-
gating the risk of mid-air collisions between aircraft. This system utilizes only current
state information and can resolve potential conflicts without knowledge of intruder
intent. The avoidance logic was verified using formal methods and shown to select the
correct action in all instances. Additionally, the fuzzy logic controllers were shown to
always turn the vehicles in the correct direction. Numerical testing demonstrated that
the avoidance system was able to prevent a mid-air collision between two sUAS in all
tested cases. Simulations were also performed in a three-dimensional environment with
a heterogeneous fleet of sUAS performing a variety of realistic missions. Simulations
showed that the system was 99.98% effective at preventing mid-air collisions when
separation assurance was disabled (unmitigated case) and 100% effective when enabled
(mitigated case).
Keywords: fuzzy logic, UAS, collision avoidance, separation assurance, formal
methods, satisfiability modulo theories
1. Introduction
In recent times, there have been substantial advances in the capability of mobile robots in several
aerospace applications. These advances include autonomous intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) efforts [1], aerial firefighting [2], and aerial delivery services [3]. However,
despite the potential benefits, these advancements are currently being under-utilized due to
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several unresolved safety issues with integrating these platforms into the National Airspace
System (NAS). As a result of these shortcomings, there is a need to develop algorithms that
allow a heterogeneous team of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) to interact autonomously
and perform time-critical tasks in complex environments. As the applications and capabilities of
sUAS continue to proliferate, it is imperative to address the safe integration of these vehicles into
the NAS.
Most of the work in this area deals with separation assurance, as it typically takes priority in
NAS conflict resolution scenarios [4, 5]. However, most methods necessitate the communica-
tion of state information between the vehicles in order to properly select resolution actions [6].
For collision avoidance, several intelligent systems have been developed with promising
results [7–12], but few have also shown behavioral verification using formal methods [13, 14].
To facilitate real-time control of a large number of sUAS, a fuzzy logic approach was implemented.
This approach was utilized to mitigate the risk of losses of separation and ultimately collisions,
between the sUAS. In order to generate scenarios to test the sUAS's ability to avoid collisions, a
realistic simulation environment was created. This simulation environment was developed in a
modular fashion, such that various algorithms could be implemented to coordinate sUAS maneu-
vers. This enables various vehicle platforms, sensor models, software packages, and traffic manage-
ment methodologies to be tested and evaluated.
The main goal of this research is to develop a high-level concept of operations for a UAS traffic
management (UTM) system. This system must address the challenges of collision avoidance
and separation assurance. Each of these platforms will utilize fuzzy logic controllers (FLCs) to
enable real-time decision-making and dynamic control. Additionally, the confidence in correct
decision-making and avoidance control outputs needs to be extremely high. Therefore, formal
methods were employed for behavioral verification.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, background material on some of the
methods and tools used in this work is described. Section 3 details the proposed solution,
which includes the separation assurance and collision avoidance methods. This includes
detailed development procedures for the decision-making and fuzzy avoidance controllers.
Section 4 presents the methodology for implementing and evaluating the decision-making and
fuzzy avoidance controllers using formal methods. Section 5 then explains the test cases, their
implementations, and an overview of the simulation environment and constraints. Section 6
presents results from the formal methods evaluations and simulation runs, and finally, Sec-
tion 7 discusses conclusions and opportunities for future work.
2. Background
2.1. Hybrid fuzzy systems
Most fuzzy inference systems (FISs) involve multiple operations that associate inputs to out-
puts based on multiple if-then rules that are resolved to a singleton. The output space is
typically nonlinear and difficult to describe as a function of the input variables. However, by
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constraining the FIS to have particular properties and association methods, an explicit expres-
sion can be more easily found.
Hybrid systems are systems that have regions of continuous behavior separated by discrete
transitions [15]. This is analogous to a subset of FISs that contain membership functions that
are constrained to a finite domain. Such FISs can be represented as hybrid systems after an
explicit expression is found. This expression maps an input set to an output set using a set of
mathematical functions. This is useful due to the number of low-level tools that have been
developed for analyzing hybrid systems. Among these are formal methods tools [16], which
are described in the following section.
2.2. Formal methods
In systems such as UTM collision avoidance algorithms, the level of confidence that they will
always behave as intended needs to be extremely high. Typical methods for evaluating these
algorithms usually involve simulation, but simulation and other numerical methods can miss
critical cases that result in undesired behavior. To increase the confidence that the avoidance
algorithms presented work as intended, formal methods were employed. Formal methods are
defined by NASA as “mathematically rigorous techniques and tools for the specification,
design, and verification of software and hardware systems.” [17] There are numerous types of
tools that fall under this definition, but in this work, satisfiability modulo theories (SMT)
solvers and model checkers were used.
SMT solvers are tools that extend the Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) problem to first order logic
(FOL) sentences and incorporate other theories for evaluating the truth assignments of vari-
ables (real values, bitvectors, etc.). If a behavior can be described in FOL, it can be encoded and
evaluated by an SMT solver to find truth assignments that violate this behavior. If a behavior is
found, it is returned as satisfying the behavioral specification. If there are no possible assign-
ments to the variables that render the specification true, it is then said to be unsatisfiable.
Therefore, “safety” properties, properties which should always hold true, can be evaluated by
negating a specification that encapsulates the respective behavior. If a satisfying case is found
for the negated specification, this means that there are conditions that violate the original
specification. If no satisfying cases are found, then the original specification will hold for all
possible conditions.
Model checkers are tools that exhaustively check the states of a system to search for combina-
tions of variable assignments that violate behavioral specifications. In finite state systems, they
use deductive proofs, and in infinite state systems, they can use inductive methods. These tools
can also use SAT or SMT solvers in conjunction with their own search methods for finding
counterexample cases. Encoding safety properties in model checkers is slightly different,
however, as model checkers typically use some type of temporal operator in conjunction with
logical sentences. However, there are methods for relating quantified FOL sentences for safety
properties to temporal representations for use in model checkers [18].
In this work, an infinite-state model checker named JKind [19, 20] was used. JKind is a Java
implementation of the Kind model checker which uses k-induction. To evaluate the truth
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assignments for variables within each state, JKind employs SMT solvers. The SMT solver used
for this work is Z3 [21], a state-of-the-art SMT solver developed by Microsoft.
3. Proposed solution
To ensure that two or more sUAS do not collide with one another, an intruder avoidance
system was developed. This avoidance problem is broken down into two sub-systems: strate-
gic (separation assurance) and tactical (collision avoidance). The strategic separation assurance
platform uses a centralized approach to coordinate trajectory modifications for sUAS to ensure
that vehicles do not get too close to one another. This separation assurance technique is
employed when two or more vehicles come within 0.4 nmi laterally of one another (separation
alert threshold), 100 ft. vertically, and are predicted to have a loss of separation (LOS), defined
by when vehicles come within 0.1 nmi laterally and 100 ft. vertically of one another. This LOS
threshold was determined based on the characteristics of the vehicle platforms and feasible
sensing abilities of sUAS. Based on the system constraints, the avoidance platform would have
roughly 2 sec to resolve maximum closure rate encounters. If the separation assurance system
fails to prevent an LOS, the vehicles will employ their onboard sense and avoid systems to
prevent a mid-air collision. A mid-air collision occurs when two vehicles come within 60 m of
one another. This collision threshold is intentionally conservative to introduce a notion of
spatial uncertainty. Since the sensor models provide perfect state information, as described in
Section 5, all vehicle locations are precisely known. For this study, the collision avoidance
platform uses a de-centralized approach, that is, all vehicles attempt to avoid intruding vehi-
cles independently. Thus, no communication between aircraft is available (i.e., uncoordinated
maneuvers). In Table 1, the various distance thresholds used to describe the separation bound-
aries are shown.
Prior to presenting the details of each avoidance sub-system, Section 3.1 provides an overview
of the avoidance system architecture. This overarching logic is used to determine when a
vehicle should perform an avoidance maneuver. When deemed necessary, the system will
activate the appropriate avoidance platform. In each avoidance platform, a set of heuristics
are used to determine the appropriate action to resolve a conflict. These details are presented in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Once the appropriate action has been decided, an FLC is used to control
the vehicle's turn rate in the desired direction. The details of each FLC are shown in Section 3.4.
Finally, it is important to note that these two sub-systems use different approaches when trying
to resolve conflicts between aircraft. This is primarily due to the overall purpose each sub-
Threshold label Lateral distance Vertical distance
Separation alert 0.4 nmi 100 ft.
LOS 0.1 nmi 100 ft.
Collision 60 m 50 ft.
Table 1. Separation threshold values.
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system serves, and the information that is available to each. If vehicles are reporting their state
information to a ground-based station, a centralized separation assurance platform could be
used to coordinate a trajectory modification to one or more of the vehicles. Thus, coordinated
maneuvers are possible. However, when two vehicles are within seconds away from a colli-
sion, minimizing the time between sensing the vehicle and performing an action is critical.
Therefore, when the collision avoidance system is activated, the vehicles must independently
choose the appropriate action using onboard processors. In these collision avoidance scenarios,
there is no communication between aircraft. Thus, each sub-system requires a different set of
rules to determine the appropriate action.
3.1. Overarching control logic
The overarching control logic determines whether to perform a separation assurance maneu-
ver, activate the collision avoidance system, or allow vehicles to continue along their desired
trajectories. This logic is shown in flow chart form in Figure 1. First, the system will find the
distance separating all aircraft pairs. With this information, a calculation is made to see how
much time can pass prior to two vehicles coming within 0.4 nmi. To calculate this value, the
current separation, minus the 0.4 nmi threshold, is divided by the maximum closure rate of the
aircraft pair. Therefore, if both vehicles moved directly toward one another at their maximum
allowable speeds, this is the time it would take them to reach the 0.4 nmi separation threshold.
This future time is known as the “time threshold”, as shown in Figure 1. Using this time
threshold, if two vehicles cannot possibly be within 0.4 nmi of one another, the system will
not unnecessarily check if the two aircraft are in conflict. Rather, it remains idle between checks
to improve the performance of the system.
Once enough time has passed and an aircraft pair reaches their assigned time threshold, the
system will again check their separation. If the two aircraft are still more than 0.4 nmi apart,
a new time threshold is calculated and set. However, if the aircraft pair has reached the 0.4
nmi threshold, it will next check to see if an LOS has occurred. If the vehicles have violated
the 0.1 nmi LOS threshold, the collision avoidance system is enabled. Otherwise, the separa-
tion assurance system may be needed to ensure that two vehicles do not have an LOS. This
decision is based on two criteria: if the predicted closest point of approach (pCPA) creates an
LOS and if the time to LOS (tLOS) is within 2 min.
If both criteria are met, a final check is used to see if the aircraft pair has already been assigned
a separation assurance maneuver. If neither vehicle has been assigned a maneuver to avoid an
impending LOS, a resolution advisory is sent from the centralized system to one of the sUAS.
However, if the sUAS was already assigned a maneuver and is currently in the middle of its
resolution, a check is used to see if turning back toward its preferred heading will cause
another predicted LOS. If resuming its originally intended mission will not cause an LOS, it
will do so, otherwise, the sUAS will continue on its current bearing.
If neither criterion (pCPA and tLOS) is met, then no separation assurance command is given
and the aircraft will continue toward its respective target using its navigation controller. After
determining the appropriate separation assurance action, or deciding that no action is needed,
the algorithm calculates another time threshold for each aircraft pair.
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Figure 1. Control logic flow chart.
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3.2. Separation assurance logic
The centralized separation assurance system observes only the current position, heading, and
velocity of each vehicle. With this limited information, vehicle intent is unknown. Therefore,
the system must be robust to dynamic scenarios and resolve conflicts without the knowledge
of other vehicles' goals.
The separation assurance platform will be enabled if three criteria are met: separation less than
0.4 nmi, the pCPA is less than 0.1 nmi, and the tLOS is within 2 min. If two aircraft meet all
three of these criteria, the separation assurance platform will activate and assign one of the
vehicles a new trajectory in an effort to avoid the predicted LOS.
To determine what action the separation assurance platform should use to avoid a potential
LOS, a series of conflict classification techniques are used. For this study, three pieces of
information are used to classify all conflict scenarios: relative heading, relative angle, and
crossing time. These parameters can be described using the more common parameters: loca-
tion, speed, and heading. In Figure 2, a sample conflict scenario is shown. Here, the triangular
objects each represent an sUAS, the arrows represent the velocities of each aircraft (both
magnitude and direction), and the “x” represents the heading intersection point location. The
heading intersection point is not to be confused with the pCPA. It is simply the point where the
projected headings intersect with one another. For this example, the vehicle with the small
circle represents aircraft 1, and the other represents aircraft 2.
The relationship used to describe the heading of vehicle 2 relative to vehicle 1's perspective is
shown in Eq. (1).
RH1 ¼ H2 H1 ð1Þ
whereH1 is the heading of vehicle 1,H2 is the heading of vehicle 2, and RH1 is the relative heading
from vehicle 1's perspective. In this study, 0 ≤ Rhi < 360
 for all vehicles, where i represents the
index for each vehicle. Therefore, if H1 > H2, a 360 phase shift must be added to RH1 to remain
within the constrained range. Computing the relative heading for the example shown in Figure 2,
RH1 would be 140
 (i.e., moving to the left with respect to vehicle 1), whereas, from vehicle 2's
perspective, RH2 would be roughly 220
 after applying the 360 phase shift (i.e., moving to the
right with respect to vehicle 2).
Similarly, the relative angle between two vehicles describes the relative position of one vehicle
with respect to the other. This relationship has been shown in Eq. (2).
Figure 2. Conflict scenario classification information.
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RA1 ¼ tan 1
y2  y1
x2  x1
 
H1 ð2Þ
where x2 and y2 are the two-dimensional coordinates of vehicle 2 in the global frame, x1 and y1
are the two-dimensional coordinates of vehicle 1 in the global frame,H1 is the heading of vehicle
1, and RA1 is the relative angle of vehicle 2 from vehicle 1's perspective. Like the relative heading,
the relative angle is constrained. Here, we constrain the relative angle by the following relation-
ship: 180 ≤RA1 ≤ 180. Therefore, if the relative angle is less than 180, a 360 phase shift is
added to meet this constraint, or if the angle is greater than 180, a 360 phase shift is subtracted.
Again, using Figure 2 as an example, RA1 would be roughly 15 after subtracting a 360 phase
shift (i.e., vehicle 2 is to the right of vehicle 1 from vehicle 1's perspective), and RA2 would be
roughly 25 (i.e., vehicle 1 is on the left of vehicle 2 from vehicle 2's perspective).
Lastly, the crossing time, t1, can be defined by the relationship shown in Eq. (3). This relation-
ship defines how long it would take for vehicle 1 to reach the heading intersection point, as
shown in Figure 2, if they remained on their current trajectory.
t1 ¼ sign V1
!  C1
!  c1
v1
ð3Þ
where sign is a function used to determine the sign (positive or negative) of an expression, V1
!
is
the velocity of vehicle 1, C1
!
is the vector used to describe the location of the heading intersec-
tion point relative to the vehicle's current position, v1 is the speed of vehicle 1, and c1 is the
magnitude of the vector C1
!
.
With these relationships, all possible encounter scenarios can be described. To aid in under-
standing what each of these parameters represent, Table 2 describes, in linguistic terms, what
each range of values represents in the physical conflict scenarios. Here, the term crossing point
Parameter Range Meaning
Relative heading 0 < RH1 < 180
 Moving from right to left
180 < RH1 < 360
 Moving from left to right
RH1 ¼ 0 Same direction
RH1 ¼ 180 Head-on
Relative angle RA1 > 0
 On left
RA1 < 0
 On right
RA1 ¼ 0 Straight ahead
Time to crossing point t1 > 0 Crossing point in front
t1 < 0 Crossing point behind
t1 > t2 Farther from crossing point
t1 < t2 Closer to crossing point
Table 2. Linguistic descriptions of encounter scenarios.
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is synonymous to the heading intersection point. Each of these descriptions has been listed to
describe the motion, location, or crossing time of vehicle 2 from vehicle 1's perspective.
Although the primary goal of this system is to ensure safe separation of vehicles, it is also
important to try and limit the number of unnecessary flight adjustments. This is particularly
important when operating sUAS due to their typical limitations in power and endurance.
Because vehicle intent is unknown in this study, a predicted LOS does not guarantee an LOS
is imminent. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between using strict and relaxed criteria when
determining if a trajectory modification is necessary. The criteria should be relaxed to ensure
sUAS do not repetitively perform unnecessary adjustments but strict enough to ensure safe
operation.
Aside from optimizing this time to predicted LOS threshold, a second way to limit the number
of vehicles that divert from their desired flight paths is to assign vehicles priority. This priority
assignment ranks all vehicles in conflict from highest priority to lowest priority. Therefore, the
vehicle with the highest priority will continue on its preferred trajectory without modification.
However, all vehicles with a lower priority must avoid all other vehicles with a higher priority.
To determine which aircraft has a lower priority, a series of evaluations are made. First, the
system will be checked to see if the two aircraft are moving in a similar direction. If two
vehicles have a heading within 5 of one another, that is, 355 ≤RH1 < 360
 or 0 ≤RH1 ≤ 5
, the
trailing aircraft will have lower priority. This encounter scenario can be seen in Figure 3. If
several aircraft have similar headings, the aircraft furthest behind will be assigned the lowest
priority so must avoid all other aircraft. However, the vehicle in the front of the group will
have the highest priority and will disregard all other aircraft.
If the vehicles in conflict do not have similar headings (i.e., more than a 5 difference), the
vehicle closest to its next waypoint is given priority. Since the separation assurance system
logic does not use the location of a vehicle's next waypoint (i.e., intent is unknown), this
priority assignment was simply a means to an end. In practice, the priority of each vehicle in
these scenarios would be randomly assigned.
To predict whether an LOS will occur, the separation assurance algorithm uses the current
location and velocity of each aircraft to calculate a projected flight path for each. Using these
projected trajectories, the pCPA between the aircraft is found. If the pCPAwill result in an LOS
within the next 2 min, a resolution is calculated and employed to prevent the predicted LOS.
Recalling the sample encounter scenario shown in Figure 2, the definitions described by Eqs. (1)
through (3), and the constraints shown in Table 2, all encounter scenarios can be described.
Figure 4 depicts all the possible conflict scenarios when vehicle 2 is located to the right of vehicle
Figure 3. Encounter example with relative heading within 5.
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1. In each diagram, the aircraft with the small circle represents vehicle 1 and the other is vehicle 2.
Thus, all parameters used to describe a particular conflict scenario are from the perspective of
vehicle 1. Within the scope of the separation assurance system, vehicle 2 is classified as the
vehicle that has been assigned the higher priority. Thus, vehicle 1 (lower priority) must perform
a maneuver to prevent an LOS.
In Figure 4(a), vehicle 2 is moving to the left, vehicle 1 is approaching from behind, and vehicle
1 is more than 45 sec closer to the heading intersection point. In this case, vehicle 1 would
decide to go in front of vehicle 2. However, if vehicle 1 is not at least 45 sec closer, it will go
behind.
In Figure 4(b), vehicle 2 is still going to the left, but in this case, it is coming toward vehicle 1.
In these scenarios, vehicle 1 must be more than 30 sec closer to the intersection point to go in
front. In Figure 4(c), vehicle 2 is to the right of vehicle 1 but is also going to the right. In these
instances, the logic will determine vehicle 1 should turn left to avoid a potential LOS. This also
holds for when vehicle 2 is located directly in front of vehicle 1. If, however, vehicle 2 is located
on the left of vehicle 1 and going left, it will be instructed to turn right. (NOTE: The 30 and
45 sec buffers were selected after testing a handful of design iterations. Optimizing these buffer
thresholds is left to future work.)
In Figure 4(d), vehicle 2's heading is parallel and coming toward vehicle 1. If vehicle 2 is
directly in front of, or to the left of, vehicle 1, the logic will instruct vehicle 1 to turn right.
However, if vehicle 2 is located to the right of vehicle 1, it will be instructed to turn left.
To prevent an aircraft from prematurely exiting an avoidance maneuver, the system checks if
reverting to the navigation controller generates another predicted LOS. Since the avoidance
controller has only local sensor knowledge (i.e., 90 ≤RA1 ≤ 90), switching back to the navi-
gation controller can result in a turning action that generates another predicted LOS. If turning
back to its desired target would create another predicted LOS, the avoiding aircraft will
continue with its trajectory until authorized to resume its desired mission.
Figure 4. Separation assurance conflict scenario classifications: (a) from behind, (b) coming toward, (c) diverging, and (d)
head-on.
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A summary of the separation assurance logic can be found in Table 3. For all cases, the
crossing time is strictly positive. That is, the absolute value of the true crossing time found
using Eq. (3) is used for all separation assurance logic.
3.3. Collision avoidance logic
When two vehicles have an LOS, are converging, and are within one another's sensor ranges,
the collision avoidance system will be activated. In this study, each sUAS will attempt to avoid
all intruders within its sensor range; therefore, no vehicle priority will be assigned. Like the
approach used for the separation assurance platform to classify conflict scenarios, the collision
avoidance system will use the same inputs to decide the appropriate action (i.e., relative angle,
relative heading, and time to crossing point). Here, it is important to note that no two vehicles
can communicate with one another. Therefore, the same logic is used onboard each system
independently. This means that from each vehicle's perspective, we need to ensure that both
vehicles will choose complementary actions, that is, the action will not force the vehicles to
turn toward one another.
In Figure 5, all possible encounter scenarios are shown. Here, the black triangle and arrow
represent the “ownship” (vehicle 1) location and heading respectively, the filled circle repre-
sents the “intruder” (vehicle 2) location, the dashed line connecting the two vehicles represents
the relative position, and the other two dashed lines represent intruder headings that are either
parallel or perpendicular to the ownship's heading. In this figure, the intruder can have any
heading between 0 and 360.
Condition Relative angle or time to cross Connector Relative heading Action
IF Any angle within sensor range
(90 ≤RA1 ≤ 90)
AND Similar direction
(RH1 < 5
 OR RH1 > 355
)
Go behind
ElseIF On right OR straight ahead
(RA1 ≤ 0
)
AND Going right
(180 < RH1 < 360
)
Go behind
ElseIF On left
(RA1 > 0
)
AND Going left
(0 < RH1 < 180
)
Go behind
ElseIF On right
(RA1 < 0
)
AND Head-on
(RH1 ¼ 180)
Turn left
ElseIF On left OR straight ahead
(RA1 ≥ 0
)
AND Head-on
(RH1 ¼ 180)
Turn right
ElseIF I’mmore than 45+ seconds closer
(t1 < (t2  45))
AND Approaching from behind
(RH1 < 90
 OR RH1 > 270
)
Go in front
ElseIF I’m NOT 45+ seconds closer
(t1 ≥ (t2  45))
AND Approaching from behind
(RH1 < 90
 OR RH1 > 270
)
Go behind
ElseIF I’mmore than 30+ seconds closer
(t1 < (t2  30))
AND Coming towards
(90 ≤RH1 ≤ 270
)
Go in front
ElseIF I’m NOT 30+ seconds closer
(t1 ≥ (t2  30))
AND Coming towards
(90 ≤RH1 ≤ 270
)
Go behind
Table 3. Summary of separation assurance logic.
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Using these dashed lines to divide the possible intruder heading into cases, the geometry of
each encounter scenario can be broken down into twelve cases, provided that two of the three
dashed lines do not coincide with one another. In Figure 5(a), the twelve cases are depicted:
two cases where the intruder has a parallel relative heading (vertical line), two cases where the
headings are perpendicular (horizontal line), two cases where the intruder heading is directly
toward or away from the ownship position (line connecting the two vehicles), and all headings
that lie in between these angles each count as one case (i.e., six angle ranges in between the
lines). If two of the three dashed lines coincide, this possible geometric space reduces to eight
possible cases, as shown in Figure 5(b) and c).
Now that the geometric configurations have been defined, let us now introduce the third
characteristic, time to heading intersection point. Unlike the separation assurance platform, the
time to the heading intersection point, or “crossing time,” can be either positive or negative.
Therefore, if the crossing point lies behind the vehicle, the crossing time becomes negative. Using
Figure 5. Classification of all possible encounter scenarios: (a) intruder not straight ahead or on side, (b) intruder on side,
(c) intruder straight ahead.
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the crossing time, there are up to three possible new situations for each of the twelve cases (or 
eight cases): the times are equal, the ownship crossing time is greater than that of the intruder, or 
the intruder crossing time is greater than that of the ownship. All possible crossing time scenar-
ios based on the relative heading and angle have been shown. All instances where the ownship 
can have a crossing time less than the intruder crossing time have been marked by an “x.” The 
black cross represents scenarios where the intruder crossing time can be less than the ownship 
crossing time. Finally, the square represents the situations where the two vehicles can have equal 
crossing times.
Using these three designations, all pairwise encounters where an intruder is not directly in 
front of or beside the ownship can be described by 20 possible cases, as shown in Figure 5(a). 
In Figure 5(b), cases where the intruder is directly beside the ownship are shown, resulting in 
12 possible cases. Lastly, if the intruder is directly in front of the ownship, 8 additional 
cases can be attained, as shown in Figure 5(c). Thus, a total of 40 cases can be attained using 
these three parameters to describe the pairwise encounter space.
Knowing that 40 possible cases have been shown, a total of four conflict classifications can be 
used to solve all possible encounter scenarios. In Figure 5, the number above each icon 
represents which of the four conflict classifications the scenario belongs. In Figures 6 and 7, 
the four conflict scenarios have been shown. In each figure, the ownship (vehicle 1) location is 
marked by a black triangle and its heading is designated by the black arrow. The small circle 
represents the location of the intruder (vehicle 2). This intruder can have any heading, but the
Figure 6. Conflict classification #1 where (t1 > 0) ∨ (t2 > 0) and: (a) t1 < t2, (b) t1 > t2.
Figure 7. Conflict classifications #2, #3, and #4: (a) (t1 < 0) ∧ (t2 < 0), (b) (t1 = t2) ∧ (t1 6¼ ∞) ∧ (t1 > 0), (c) (t1 = t2) ∧ (t1 = ∞).
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different headings have been separated into different sections, as designated by the shaded
regions. In each figure, the shaded regions represent the intruder headings that are excluded
by that particular encounter scenario, whereas, the unshaded regions are the possible intruder
headings allowed by that encounter scenario. In addition, like Figure 5, there is a dashed line
connecting the two vehicles to represent the relative position. Lastly, if a dashed black line is on
the boundary of the included and excluded regions, this represents an inclusive boundary (i.e.,
that heading is included in the possible headings allowed), whereas, the solid black line
between the regions represents an exclusive boundary.
Figure 6 shows the first conflict classification scenario. Here, at least one of the vehicles must
have a positive crossing time (ti), and they are not equal to one another. As shown in Figure 6(a),
the ownship crossing time must be strictly less than that of the intruder. Thus, the intruder
crossing time can be negative, or equal to zero (i.e., pointed directly at the ownship). If the
intruder heading passes into the excluded region, either both values are negative, or the ownship
value must be greater than the intruder value. For all the cases that satisfy this relationship, the
ownship would determine to go in front of the intruder. Including the instances where the
intruder is to the left of the ownship.
In Figure 6(b), the ownship crossing time must be strictly greater than that of the intruder
crossing time. As seen in the figure, the boundary along the relative position line is excluded
when the intruder is pointing toward the ownship (i.e., the ownship crossing time is zero, but the
intruder crossing time is positive), violating the relationship. However, when the intruder is
pointed directly away from the ownship, the boundary is inclusive. In all possible instances, the
ownship will determine to go behind the intruder. This includes the cases when the intruder is
located to the left of the ownship or is directly in front of the ownship (i.e., t2 = 0). For all cases
represented by conflict classification #1, if one vehicle decides to go in front, the other will decide
to go behind, given that they are both within one another's sensor field of view.
In the second conflict classification, as shown in Figure 7(a), both the intruder and the ownship
have crossing times less than zero. These negative crossing times, and the fact that the vehicles
cannot have the same heading, result in the intruder never sensing the ownship. In these
scenarios, if the intruder is on the left, the ownship will turn right. But, if the intruder is on
the right, the ownship will turn left.
In Figure 7(b), the scenarios where both the ownship and the intruder have the same time to
the crossing point are shown. In this classification case, the intruder cannot have the same
heading as the ownship, thus it must be crossing the ownship's path. In addition, this case is
restricted to instances where both vehicles have strictly positive crossing times. For these
instances, regardless of whether the vehicle is on the left, or on the right, both vehicles will
decide to turn right. Since the crossing times are equivalent, and there is no coordination of
intent with the other vehicle, both vehicles must choose the same action.
There is one remaining aircraft orientation in the encounter space. This occurs when an intruder
is parallel to the ownship, either traveling in the same or opposite direction. This scenario has
been shown in Figure 7(c). As seen from this figure, only intruder headings that lie on the
dashed line are included. If the intruder is to the right of the ownship, each vehicle will turn to
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the left (given that the intruder can see the ownship as well). However, if the intruder is directly
in front of, or to the left of the ownship, both vehicles will be instructed to turn right.
Although the above classifications describe all possible encounters between moving aircraft,
the quad-rotor vehicles can stop and hover. Therefore, a final classification must be described.
If an intruder is stationary, the intruder crossing time is set to negative infinity. When this is the
case, if the intruder is to the left or directly in front of the ownship, the controller will instruct
the vehicle to turn right. However, if the intruder is to the right of the ownship, the logic will
instruct the vehicle to turn left.
Table 4 describes the different encounter scenarios using both linguistic and mathematical
descriptions, as well as the decided actions. Each of the above conflict classification numbers
numerically matches the respective cases in this table. However, the encounter scenario where
the intruder vehicle is stationary is referred to as case 0. Like Table 3, the linguistic descriptions
in Table 4 represent how the ownship perceives the intruder. Furthermore, all values with the
subscript 1 represent the ownship, whereas, all values with the subscript 2 represent the intruder.
(NOTE: the * designation indicates that the crossing time is negative infinity for that vehicle.)
3.4. Fuzzy inference systems
Using the methodology described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, four possible actions can be used to
avoid an intruding sUAS: go behind, go in front, turn right, and turn left. When the command
Case Position Direction Time to cross Crossing point location Action
0 On left or straight
(0 ≤RA1 ≤ 90
)
N/A More
(t1 > t2)
N/A Turn right
On right
(90 ≤RA1 < 0)
N/A More
(t1 > t2)
N/A Turn left
1 Any
(90 ≤RA1 ≤ 90)
Not parallel
(RH1 6¼ {180, 0})
Less
(t1 < t2)
Not behind both
(t1 ≥ 0 OR t2 ≥ 0)
Go in front
Any
(90 ≤RA1 ≤ 90)
Not parallel
(RH1 6¼ {180, 0})
More
(t1 > t2)
Not behind both
(t1 ≥ 0 OR t2 ≥ 0)
Go behind
2 On left
(RA1 > 0
)
Going left away
(RH1 < 90
)
Any Behind both
(t1 < 0 AND t2 < 0)
Turn right
On right
(RA1 < 0
)
Going right away
(RH1 > 270
)
Any Behind both
(t1 < 0 AND t2 < 0)
Turn left
3 On left
(RA1 > 0
)
Going right
(180 < RH1 < 360)
Equal
(t1 = t2)
In front of both
(t1 > 0 AND t2 > 0)
Turn right
On right
(RA1 < 0
)
Going left
(0 < RH1 < 180
)
Equal
(t1 = t2)
In front of both
(t1 > 0 AND t2 > 0)
Turn right
4 On left or straight
(RA1 ≥ 0
)
Head-on or same
(RH1 ¼ {180, 0})
Equal
(t1 = t2)
N/A Turn right
On right
(RA1 < 0
)
Head-on or same
(RH1 ¼ {180, 0})
Equal
(t1 = t2)
N/A Turn left
Table 4. Summary of collision avoidance logic.
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action is either go in front or go behind, the corresponding FIS is activated to execute the
maneuver. Therefore, two FISs were developed for this study: go in front and go behind. If a
turn left or turn right command is selected, the turn rate of the vehicle will always be a
constant value, either positive or negative, depending on which way it should turn. This
constant value is one half of the maximum turn rate for collision avoidance maneuvers and
one eighth of the maximum turn rate for separation assurance maneuvers.
Both the go in front and go behind fuzzy systems are of Mamdani-type and were constructed
in such a way that the input-output relationship can be described using a simple mathematical
representation. By using a hybrid representation, as described in Section 2.1, the fuzzy system
can easily be expressed mathematically. In this study, the fuzzy systems have a common
architecture: triangular membership functions, normalized inputs and outputs, membership
function partitioning, product “and” method, minimum implication method, sum aggrega-
tion, and mean of maximum defuzzification. If more than one membership function exists for a
particular input or output, membership functions are partitioned such that the endpoints of
one membership function coincides with the center points of the neighboring membership
functions.
Each FIS was developed using a three-input one-output structure. Each FIS uses the distance
separating the two aircraft, their relative heading, and their closure rate as inputs to determine
the appropriate turn rate output. Since a heterogeneous system is used in this study, the FIS
must provide a sufficient turn rate output to avoid a collision for all vehicle type combinations.
By considering the separation and closure rate, the conflict can be solved without expelling
more energy than required.
In order to use the FISs for both the separation assurance and the collision avoidance plat-
forms, all inputs and outputs must be normalized. Regardless of the avoidance platform being
used, the relative heading and closure rate inputs are always normalized by the same values.
The relative heading which falls between 0 and 360 is divided by 360. Thus, a normalized
relative heading of 0.5 would represent a head-on encounter. The closure rate is normalized by
dividing the true closure rate by the maximum possible closure rate between two vehicles (i.e.,
61.762 m/sec in this study). This maximum closure rate would be a result of two fixed wing
vehicles approaching one another in a head-on scenario.
The third input, distance, is normalized by 0.4 nmi for separation assurance cases and 0.1 nmi
for collision avoidance cases. Lastly, the turn rate output is always between 1 and 1. This
output is then scaled by the respective vehicle platform's maximum turn rate. In the case of the
collision avoidance system, the output is also multiplied by 1.58. This is to compensate for the
fuzzy output not providing a sufficient turn rate command to avoid a collision, especially in
head-on scenarios.
Figure 8 shows the structure of each avoidance FIS. Here, the number of membership func-
tions and the corresponding classification can be seen for each input and output. Both the
relative heading and the turn rate are partitioned such that the endpoints of the center mem-
bership functions coincide with the center points of the adjacent membership functions. As a
result of this, and using a product “and” connector, for all possible inputs, at most two of the
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three rules will be active at one time. This drastically reduces the possible solution space,
making it much easier to represent the system mathematically.
The input and output membership function sets for both the go behind and go in front FISs are
identical. However, the rule bases associating the inputs and outputs are opposite, therefore,
when one FIS outputs “turn right” (i.e., negative turn rate), the other FIS would output “turn
left” (i.e., positive turn rate), and vice versa. In Table 5, the respective rule bases can be seen.
Because the other two inputs only have one membership function, they have been excluded
from the table.
Rule # Input 1:
relative heading
Go in front output Go behind output
1 Left Left Right
2 Center Center Center
3 Right Right Left
Table 5. FIS logic.
Figure 8. Avoidance FIS structure: (a) Input 1, (b) Input 2, (c) Input 3, (d) Output.
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To map the fuzzy system to a set of nonlinear expressions, the following process was used.
First, the system was discretized into three possible modes based on the domain of the ith
input, Di. These modes are described in Table 6. Here, let a square bracket represent an
inclusive bound and a round bracket represent an exclusive bound. Based on the structure of
the FIS, if input 1 is exactly 0.5 (Mode 2 in Table 6), the output will yield a turn rate of 0. It
remains to find the explicit input-to-output mappings for modes 1 and 3.
When the FIS is in mode 1, only the “Left” and “Center” membership functions are active.
Thus, the output will be independent of rule 3. Therefore, given that a product “and” method
and a mean of maximum aggregation technique is used, the following relationship describes
how the output is calculated.
_Ψ ¼
Y3
i¼1
hi1
 !
þ 1
Y3
i¼1
hi2
!" #
=2 ð4Þ
where, _Ψ , is the turn rate, hi1 is the degree of membership for the i
th input membership
function when using rule 1 (i.e., left, close, fast membership functions), and hi2 is the degree of
membership for each input when using rule 2. When substituting the equation of each mem-
bership function into Eq. (4), the expression shown in Eq. (5) is found, which can be reduced to
the polynomial shown in Eq. (6).
_Ψ ¼ 2μ1 þ 1
  μ2 þ 1  μ3  	þ 1 2μ1  μ2 þ 1  μ3  	
 =2 ð5Þ
_Ψ ¼ 4μ1μ2μ3  4μ1μ3  μ2μ3 þ μ3 þ 1
 
=2 ð6Þ
where μ1, μ2, and μ3 are inputs 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The polynomial shown in Eq. (6) can be
used to map any combination of inputs that belong to D1 to an output for the go in front FIS.
Using the same methodology for mode 3, Eqs. (7) through (9) can be found.
_Ψ ¼ 
Y3
i¼1
hi3
 !
þ
Y3
i¼1
hi2  1
!" #
=2 ð7Þ
_Ψ ¼  2μ1 þ 1
  μ2 þ 1  μ3  	þ 2μ1 þ 2  μ2 þ 1  μ3  1 	
 =2 ð8Þ
_Ψ ¼ 4μ1μ2μ3  4μ1μ3  3μ2μ3 þ 3μ3  1
 
=2 ð9Þ
Mode # D1 D2 D3
1 [0,0.5) [0,1] [0,1]
2 [0.5] [0,1] [0,1]
3 (0.5,1] [0,1] [0,1]
Table 6. Input domains.
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The polynomial shown in Eq. (9) will map any combination of inputs belonging to D3 to an
output for the go in front FIS.
This same approach was used to map any combination of inputs for the go behind FIS to an
output using a polynomial function. Since the rule bases are exactly opposite to one another,
the output is the negation of Eqs. (6) and (9). Eqs. (10) and (11) describe the input-output
relationships for modes 1 and 3, respectively, for the go behind FIS.
_Ψ ¼ 4μ1μ2μ3 þ 4μ1μ3 þ μ2μ3  μ3  1
 
=2 ð10Þ
_Ψ ¼ 4μ1μ2μ3 þ 4μ1μ3 þ 3μ2μ3  3μ3 þ 1
 
=2 ð11Þ
It is important to note that if three or more vehicles are in conflict, each pair of vehicles will
be evaluated separately. Thus, for a single ownship, several turn rate outputs will be
obtained. Once all respective turn rates are calculated for each intruder, the values are
averaged into a single value. This mean turn rate serves as the final vehicle turn rate
command.
4. Avoidance algorithm verification
To verify that the avoidance algorithm performed as intended, two levels of avoidance control
were evaluated. The first was the high-level, decision-making logic that determined which
action a vehicle would take during potential collision scenarios as shown in Table 4. The
second that was evaluated was the low-level logic in the avoidance FLCs. These FLCs deter-
mine the actual vehicle turn rate output after being selected by the decision-making heuristics.
For each of these levels, specifications about their behavior were developed and then trans-
lated into FOL sentences that could be evaluated by an SMT solver. For the first cases that deal
with the avoidance decision-making logic, the specifications and system model were
implemented in JKind, with Z3 being used as the SMT solver. The evaluation of the avoidance
FISs was performed directly in Z3. The difference was purely a practical one, as the language
JKind uses, Lustre [22], is more conducive to easily create a more detailed environment model.
4.1. Collision avoidance decision-making logic
As shown in Table 4, there are several conditions for which there are different output actions
for avoidance. The specifications were first translated into FOL sentences. The sentences are
shown in the following equations. Note that RAL is a predicate that acts on the relative angle
limit to represent the vehicle's sensors detecting an intruder. Since they can only sense
intruders between 90, the relative angle values were limited in the specifications such that
being in that range implied that the output action would be the correct one. If the intruder is
outside of this range, the specifications do not say what the output action should be. Note that
the variables out1 and out2 are the output actions for the two vehicles. Since both vehicles pick
actions based on the states and have no knowledge of the other vehicle's selected action, the
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specifications need to go both ways. Also, the actions are represented by integer values 1–4
such that {1,2,3,4} = {go behind, go in front, turn left, turn right}, respectively.
Although several avoidance actions could be taken by each vehicle, only cases 1, 3, and 4
required formal verification. In these cases, both vehicles can sense one another and will
perform some type of avoidance maneuver. Thus, their actions must be such that they do not
move closer to one another. In cases 0 and 2, however, there was no need to write requirements
because only one vehicle performs an avoidance action. In case 0, vehicle 2 is stationary, so it
does not try to avoid vehicle 1. In case 2, vehicle 2 cannot sense vehicle 1, thus, there is no need
to check that the two vehicles' actions produce a converging result.
Eqs. (12) through (15) are the specifications for case 1 in Table 4 and are intended to ensure that
the vehicles do not both choose to go in front, or go behind.
S11 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! out1 ¼ 1! out2 ¼ 2ð Þð Þ ð12Þ
S12 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! out1 ¼ 2! out2 ¼ 1ð Þð Þ ð13Þ
S13 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! out2 ¼ 1! out1 ¼ 2ð Þð Þ ð14Þ
S14 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! out2 ¼ 2! out1 ¼ 1ð Þð Þ ð15Þ
Eqs. (16) and (17) are the specifications for case 3 and ensure that the vehicles turn the same
way when resolving these particular conflicts. Recall that in this case, both vehicles are at
the same time from the crossing point. This specification ensures that they will then be
forced into new positions such that the crossing times are not equal and the FISs are then
selected.
S31 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! t1 ¼ t2 ∧ t1 > 0 ∧ t2 > 0 ∧ RH1 ≥ 0 ∧RH1ððððð
< 180Þ ∨ RH1 > 180 ∧RH1 < 360ð ÞÞÞ ! out1 ¼ 4 ∧ out2 ¼ 4ð ÞÞÞ ð16Þ
S32 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! t1 ¼ t2 ∧ t1 > 0 ∧ t2 > 0 ∧ RH2 ≥ 0 ∧RH2ððððð
< 180Þ ∨ RH2 > 180 ∧RH2 < 360ð ÞÞÞ ! out2 ¼ 4 ∧ out1 ¼ 4ð ÞÞÞ ð17Þ
Finally, Eqs. (18) and (19) are for case 4. These two specifications are for cases where the
vehicles are head-on, or traveling next to each other in the same direction, respectively. The
first specification ensures that while in a head-on encounter, both vehicles turn the same
direction (i.e., both left, or both right, forcing them to diverge). The second specification
ensures that while traveling in the same direction, the vehicles turn in opposite directions.
S41 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! t1 ¼ t2 ∧ RH1 ¼ 180 ∧RH2ðððð
¼ 180ÞÞ ! out1 ¼ 3 ∧ out2 ¼ 3ð Þ ∨ out1 ¼ 4 ∧ out2 ¼ 4ð Þð ÞÞÞ ð18Þ
S42 ¼ ∀RA1∀RA2∀RH1∀RH2 RAL! t1 ¼ t2 ∧ RH1 ¼ 0 ∧RH2ðððð
¼ 0ÞÞ ! out1 ¼ 3 ∧ out2 ¼ 4ð Þ ∨ out1 ¼ 4 ∧ out2 ¼ 3ð Þð ÞÞÞ ð19Þ
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where t1 is the time until the crossing point, RH1 is the relative heading from vehicle 1 to vehicle
2, and RA1 is the relative angle from vehicle 1 to vehicle 2. Similarly, t2, RH2 , and RA2 are for
vehicle 2. In addition to these specifications, another specification was created to ensure that
the vehicles always chose one of the valid actions. This specification is not shown but is similar
to Eqs. (12) through (19) such that the output actions are one of the possible outcomes (1–4).
These specifications were then translated to a temporal representation for evaluation in JKind
using previously developed methods [18].
4.2. Avoidance fuzzy inference systems
The method for verifying the avoidance FISs is similar, but the specifications were left in FOL
and then implemented directly into Z3. The main reason for this was that less of the system
model was needed to check these outputs. The behavior that the specifications needed to
encapsulate was that the turn rate output for each FIS needs to always be in the correct
direction. The correct direction for each of these cases is shown in Table 7.
These can then be encoded in FOL sentences using the polynomial representation of the FISs
shown in Section 3.4. These sentences are then negated to show that there are no possible
variable values that make the negated sentences true. The negated FOL sentences are shown in
Eqs. (20) through (23). Note that μ1, μ2, μ3, _Ψ , and modes 1 and 3 are the same as detailed in
Section 3.4.
Sbehind1 ¼ ∃μ1∃μ2∃μ3 _Ψ μ1;μ2;μ3
 
≥ 0
  ð20Þ
Sbehind3 ¼ ∃μ1∃μ2∃μ3 _Ψ μ1;μ2;μ3
 
≤ 0
  ð21Þ
Sfront1 ¼ ∃μ1∃μ2∃μ3 _Ψ μ1;μ2;μ3
 
≤ 0
  ð22Þ
Sfront3 ¼ ∃μ1∃μ2∃μ3 _Ψ μ1;μ2;μ3
 
≥ 0
  ð23Þ
These negated sentences were then implemented in Z3. If Z3 finds that these sentences were all
unsatisfiable, there are no possible real-valued assignments to μ1, μ2, or μ3 that allow the FISs
to turn the vehicles in an undesired direction.
Mode Action Intruder position Intruder direction Turn direction
1 Go behind On right Going left Right (negative)
3 Go behind On left Going right Left (positive)
1 Go in front On right Going left Left (positive)
3 Go in front On left Going right Right (negative)
Table 7. Avoidance FIS outputs.
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5. Simulation environment descriptions
5.1. Testing environment
Prior to integrating the controllers presented in Section 3 into the full simulation environment,
each avoidance platform was tested using pairwise encounter scenarios. This component
testing was used to ensure that each was operating as desired. In this section, the methods
used to test each controller are described.
5.1.1. Separation assurance
A testing environment was created to evaluate a considerable amount of pairwise encounters
between aircraft. This testing environment was used to identify potential controller failures. To
accomplish this, various initial relative headings and relative angles were tested. In all cases,
the initial location and heading of one aircraft was held constant. Then, by placing the intrud-
ing vehicle at a relative angle of 90 and just outside the vehicle's sensing radius, as shown in
Figure 9, we evaluated the interactions for 720 initial intruder heading values. This was then
repeated four more times by changing the initial relative angle between 90 (to the right) and
0 (straight ahead). Avisualization of these scenarios is shown in Figure 9. Note that the radius
of the sensing semi-circle for the separation assurance tests was set at 0.4 nmi.
Although intruders can approach a vehicle from the left, that is, a relative angle between
0 and 90, symmetry allows us to limit the initial relative angles to lie between 90 and 0.
To verify, a sample scenario was tested for the full field of view. In all cases, the trajectories of
the vehicles were symmetric to one another (i.e., when reflected across the vehicle's initial
heading).
Figure 9. Separation and avoidance testing scenarios between ownship (triangle) and intruder UAS for multiple different
initial positions (circles).
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5.1.2. Collision avoidance
The collision avoidance platformwas tested in the samemanner as the separation assurance. The
difference being that the sensing radius for the interaction tests as shown in Figure 9 is 0.1 nmi.
Thus, the initial position of each intruder scenario was just outside of this sensing radius.
5.2. Full simulation environment
5.2.1. Airspace description
The simulation environment created for this study models a portion of the US airspace over
central Ohio. A depiction of the selected airspace can be seen in Figure 10. This airspace covers
approximately 2500 square miles where sUAS can operate at a maximum altitude of 400 ft.
5.2.2. Mission types and objectives
Many sUAS will be active throughout this airspace, each with individual missions, such as,
precision agriculture, forest monitoring, roadway surveillance, disaster management, and
package delivery. During simulation runs, the UAS will travel to various waypoints to fulfill
their assigned missions. After visiting all waypoints for a given mission, the aircraft will return
to their respective starting locations. For more on the mission types, please refer to Refs.
[11, 12].
Figure 10. Simulation platform example.
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5.2.3. Scalability and operations
The full simulation environment can accommodate any number of sUAS and missions. How-
ever, these numbers were constant throughout testing. A maximum of 184 sUAS can be
airborne at any given time. This is a result of having centralized control of the aircraft. In a
realistic environment, some of the computationally heavy components can be handled in
parallel onboard each individual sUAS.
5.2.4. Aircraft models
Two vehicle platforms were used in all simulations: fixed wing and quad-rotor. Kinematic
models were developed for each within the constraints of the environment. These constraints
include maximum turn rate, maximum climb/decent rate, minimum/maximum speed, and
maximum altitude.
For this study, each aircraft is assumed to climb at 4 ft./sec upon takeoff. The vehicles will
continue to climb at this rate until an altitude of 400 ft. is reached. When vehicles are in
conflict and are required to make trajectory modifications, all adjustments are constrained to
lateral deviations in flight path (i.e., speed and altitude modifications are not used). There-
fore, UAS are limited to level, two-dimensional flight during conflict resolution scenarios.
Using this assumption, the maximum turn rate for each fixed wing vehicle is described in
Eq. (24).
_Ψ max ¼ g
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n2  1
p
V
ð24Þ
All fixed wing vehicles travel at 60 knots and have a maximum load factor of 3.5. Therefore,
they are constrained to a maximum turn rate of 61.06 deg/sec. The multi-rotor systems,
however, can travel at a maximum airspeed of 38 knots. Due to the nature of the quad-rotor
sUAS, Eq. (24) does not accurately model the maximum turn rate for this vehicle type and it is
assumed that the aircraft can yaw at a maximum rate of 45 deg/sec. Also, each aircraft is
assumed to have the capability to detect an intruding aircraft at a distance of 0.1 nmi if within
a 180 field of view in front of the aircraft (i.e., 90 ≤RA1 ≤ 90).
As previously described in Table 1, the collision threshold is defined by aircraft coming
within 60 m laterally and 50 ft. vertically of one other. To track the vehicles, ground-based
sensors for detecting aircraft have been dispersed in the airspace. These sensors, along with
telemetry data, provide continuous and reliable vehicle state information (i.e., position and
velocity). This capability allows the implementation of global separation assurance prac-
tices. More details about the simulation environment and its properties can be found in
Refs. [11, 12]. (NOTE: The collision buffer value was used to accommodate for position
uncertainties while tracking the sUAS. In this study, the avoidance system has perfect
knowledge of all vehicle state information acquired from ground based and onboard
sensors.)
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6. Results
6.1. Avoidance systems testing
For each pairwise encounter shown in Figure 9, the closest point of approach (CPA) was 
found. The CPA is defined as the minimum recorded distance between the two vehicles 
throughout the entire encounter. For both the collision avoidance and separation assurance 
platforms, a total of four different vehicle platform trials were conducted: fixed vs. fixed, quad 
vs. quad, quad vs. fixed, and fixed vs. quad. The first vehicle type designation represents the 
ownship vehicle's type in Figure 9 (i.e., has the same starting position and heading for all 
tested cases), whereas, the second vehicle platform designation represents the intruder 
vehicle's type (i.e., initial conditions change for each tested scenario).
To measure the effectiveness of the avoidance logic, the minimum CPA was recorded for all 
initial relative angles tested. In addition, the total number of collisions for each case were 
tallied, and for the separation assurance case, the total number of LOSs. As a reminder, a 
collision is deemed by two vehicles coming within 60 m of one another, and an LOS is when 
two vehicles come with 0.1 nmi of one another.
The results for the separation assurance testing have been shown in Table 8. Here, the “angle 
case” refers to the various initial relative angles, from 90 to 0, respectively. Thus, case 1 
represents an intruder directly to the right, and case 5 represents an intruder directly in front of 
the ownship.
Although all vehicle platform combinations had more than one LOS, no LOS resulted in two 
vehicles colliding (i.e., a CPA less than 60 m). To try and understand where the separation 
assurance platform was breaking down to allow an LOS to occur, the CPA results were plotted 
for each initial intruder heading. When evaluating the results of each vehicle case, it was found 
that although several LOSs occurred, the failures tended to lie in groups near the same 
intruder angle depending on the initial position of the intruder. For example, in the fixed vs. 
quad case, it can be seen that no LOSs occurred in the first three trials. However, once the 
intruder was positioned such that it was nearly in front of or directly in front of the ownship,
Angle case Fixed vs. Fixed Quad vs. Quad Fixed vs. Quad Quad vs. Fixed
Min CPA (m) LOS Min CPA (m) LOS Min CPA (m) LOS Min CPA (m) LOS
1 185.3 0 185.1 0 574.3 0 185.8 0
2 185.6 0 185.5 0 351.4 0 158.6 12
3 185.3 0 185.4 0 185.6 0 133.2 24
4 186.1 0 131.2 9 175.1 24 137.3 31
5 98.4 116 137.0 8 128.1 161 132.0 28
Table 8. Separation assurance testing results.
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the separation assurance platform began to fail. This was caused by the fixed wing vehicle
traveling at higher speeds than the quad-rotor vehicle. Therefore, when the intruder heading
was away from the ownship, the ownship tended to approach the intruder from behind and
begin to pass the vehicle. When approaching the vehicle from behind, it proved difficult for the
avoidance platform to solve the conflict prior to an LOS in all vehicle configurations, as shown
by angle case 5.
Table 9 shows the results of the collision avoidance testing. Each case had a minimum CPA
greater than 60 m, implying no collisions were found throughout testing. Although not all
possible encounter scenarios have been tested, this shows that the avoidance system logic is
quite robust. As seen from the results, the homogeneous quad-rotor and the fixed vs. quad
cases showed promising results. They consistently had a higher minimum CPA than the other
two cases. The closure rates in the fixed vs. fixed cases were higher than cases involving quad-
rotors. This resulted in consistently lower minimum CPA values. A noteworthy result is in the
fixed vs. fixed scenario for angle case 5. The intruder being head-on and directly in front of the
ownship resulted in a CPA of 60.8 m. Although this is close to the collision boundary, this
shows that even in the highest closure rate scenario, the collision avoidance system was able to
resolve the conflict.
6.2. Formal verification
6.2.1. Avoidance logic
After evaluating all the specifications outlined in Eqs. (12) through (19), JKind returned that
they always held. This means that for all possible real-valued assignments to the variables
(within the sensor domain limitations), the vehicles will always select the desired output
action.
Although the final version of the avoidance logic adhered to all of the specifications, during
development there were several cases where JKind found values that violated one or more of
the specifications. These counterexamples are invaluable as they identify exact cases that result
in undesired behavior. This gives way to corrections based on the counterexample conditions.
Fixed vs. Fixed Quad vs. Quad Fixed vs. Quad Quad vs. Fixed
Angle Case Min CPA (m) Min CPA (m) Min CPA (m) Min CPA (m)
1 132.1 138.9 154.7 125.3
2 111.9 125.2 133.3 121.0
3 101.9 113.5 122.9 111.1
4 82.9 104.4 103.5 97.8
5 60.8 96.7 98.9 99.0
Table 9. Collision avoidance testing results.
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As an example of this, one of the conditions that violated a specification found during devel-
opment is shown in Table 10.
These conditions mean that one vehicle is heading in the exact opposite direction of the other
and there is a slight position offset between them as shown in Figure 11. One vehicle selects the
turn left action (3) while the other selects the turn right action (4). This implies they are not
turning away from each other. The reason for this was that the range of angles that would force
vehicle 1 into the correct action was not inclusive on one of its boundaries. This then meant that
the conditions forced vehicle 1 into a different action and generated this counterexample.
6.2.2. Avoidance FISs
Similarly, after evaluating the specifications in Eqs. (20) through (23), Z3 showed that they
were all unsatisfiable. This shows that the FLCs will always make the ownship turn away from
an intruder.
6.3. Full simulation results
To test the algorithms in a dynamic environment, simulations were run both with the separa-
tion assurance mitigations and then without. The number of LOSs and number of collisions
were recorded in order to directly compare the mitigated and unmitigated cases.
6.3.1. Unmitigated study
For this unmitigated study, the separation assurance system was disabled. The results of this
study are shown in Table 11.
Separation less
than 0.4 nmi
LOSs Collision
avoidance
maneuvers
Collisions Collision
avoidance
success rate
Number of
flight hours
LOSs per
flight hour
Collisions
per flight
hour
26,576 8263 8252 2 99.98% 25,116 0.33 7.96  1015
Table 11. Results for simulation without separation assurance.
Specification RH1 RA1 out1 RH2 RA2 out2
S32 180 5  1015 3 180 5  1015 4
Table 10. Avoidance logic counter-example values.
Figure 11. Counterexample showing head-on vehicles turning into each other.
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Over the span of 25,116 flight hours, there were 26,576 recorded violations of the 0.4 nmi
separation threshold. These resulted in 8263 LOSs. The collision avoidance algorithm was
employed for all except for 11 LOS occurrences. In those cases, the vehicles were outside of
one another's field of view, thus the collision avoidance system was not used. The collision
avoidance system was 99.98% successful at resolving conflicts.
The only collisions that occurred throughout simulation can be attributed to the restriction on
the detection sensor field of view and having no memory of state time histories. Therefore, if
two vehicles were nearly parallel and directly beside one another, they would turn to resolve
the conflict (i.e., turn away from one another). However, this turning again puts each intruder
outside of the other vehicle's field of view. The lack of state memory combined with no sensor
input caused a switch back to their navigation controllers. The navigation controller caused
them to go back toward one another. Since the navigation controller had a higher turn rate
output than the avoidance output, this cycle would continue (each vehicle turning away then
toward) until they converged and were within 60 m of one another.
6.3.2. Mitigated study
For this study, the separation assurance features were enabled to help mitigate the risk of
having an LOS. Although fewer LOSs were expected with the mitigations enabled, some LOSs
were expected due to sub-optimal performance in head-on and trailing situations. The results
of this mitigated study are shown in Tables 12 and 13.
Table 12 presents the results of the separation assurance platform. In this mitigated study, only
9277 flight hours were recorded. Thus, sUAS were able to complete their respective missions in a
shorter period of time. Throughout the simulation aircraft came within 0.4 nmi on 33,550 occa-
sions. However, of those instances, the separation assurance system predicted an LOS to occur
within 2 min only 14,750 times. Of these resolution advisories, only 75.74% were successful,
resulting in 3579 LOSs and 0.39 LOSs per flight hour. Although this number is slightly larger than
the number of LOSs per flight hour in the unmitigated study, this additional layer of avoidance
kept vehicles from entering any scenarios that resulted in collision. Thus, the overall safety of the
UTM system has been improved.
Separation less than
0.4 nmi
Separation assurance
maneuvers
LOSs Separation assurance
success rate
Number of flight
hours
LOSs per flight
hour
33,550 14,750 3579 75.74% 9277 0.39
Table 12. Separation assurance results.
Collision avoidance
maneuvers
Collisions Collision avoidance
success rate
Number of
flight hours
Collisions per
flight hour
3568 0 100.00% 9277 0
Table 13. Collision avoidance results.
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If an LOS occurred and the vehicles were within one another's sensor ranges, the sense and
avoid software would activate. The results of the collision avoidance software can be seen in
Table 13. Of the 3568 encounters, the collision avoidance software was 100.00% successful at
resolving conflicts.
7. Conclusion
In this work, multiple fuzzy logic controllers and decision-making systems were used in
conjunction to prevent potential losses of separation in a congested, three-dimensional air-
space. This simulation environment allowed for extensive encounter scenarios between het-
erogeneous vehicles to test the two conflict resolution systems. First, a sense and avoid system
was developed to prevent potential collisions using only current state information and without
communication between vehicles. Next, a separation assurance platform was developed to
further mitigate the risk of a potential collision. This platform uses global aircraft state infor-
mation to predict if two aircraft will have an LOS within a given look-ahead time. If an LOS
was predicted, the system would issue necessary resolution advisories to the proper aircraft to
prevent an LOS.
Once the controllers were developed, numerical simulations and formal methods were used to
verify the controllers performed as expected. Using a formal methods approach, we could
show that the controller output was always in the correct direction (i.e., always performed as
expected). In addition, we were able to verify that in all pairwise encounter scenarios between
sUAS, the actions of each vehicle were such that they would never turn toward one another
when avoiding a collision.
After a formal methods approach verified the control logic behavior and fuzzy logic controller
outputs, numerical simulations were conducted. In all simulations, the avoidance system had
perfect knowledge of all vehicle state information (i.e., speed, heading, and location). For the
collision avoidance scenarios tested, the fuzzy system was successful at resolving all potential
conflicts for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. However, the separation assur-
ance platform had trouble resolving certain types of encounter scenarios. Thus, it sometimes
would not prevent an LOS between vehicles. However, when an LOS occurred, the collision
avoidance system again prevented any mid-air collisions from occurring.
Several full simulation environment missions were also run to evaluate the effectiveness of the
avoidance algorithms. These missions included cases where the separation assurancemitigations
were both enabled and disabled. Overall, the results of this experiment were as expected. In the
mitigated study, no collisions between aircraft occurred. However, when the mitigations were
removed, vehicles encountered scenarios where the collision avoidance system could not prevent
a collision. These collisions were not due to the collision avoidance logic or the fuzzy logic
controllers, but were attributed to the limited vehicle sensor performance and lack of memory.
For future work, we aim to improve upon the separation assurance techniques to prevent an
LOS in all encounter scenarios. Also, representing the system with a higher fidelity model of
the environment in the formal methods tools would allow for more complete specifications
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(i.e., vehicles never lose separation) and then identify cases that violate them. In addition, since
the avoidance system had perfect vehicle state information, we would like to introduce a level
of uncertainty to the sensor models. Finally, we wish to implement the proposed avoidance
software into hardware testing environments.
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